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Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2021

Representing belief: beyond probability and logic

Résumé

This chapter surveys recent approaches to the representation of belief. There is a clash between the notion of degree of belief in the subjective probability tradition and the idea of certainty as accepted belief often couched in the language of logic, and especially modal logic. The attempt to consider degrees of certainty finds its origin in the works of Francis Bacon often opposed to the one of Pascal. However, by reviewing some more recent trends in the representation of uncertainty, such as possibility theory, ranking theory, evidence theory and imprecise probability, one may argue that these novel approaches try to bridge the gap between the two traditions, even if dropping some favourite properties on the way, such as the additivity of degrees of belief and the adjunction law for accepted beliefs.
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Dates et versions

hal-03545993 , version 1 (27-01-2022)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-03545993 , version 1

Citer

Didier Dubois, Henri Prade. Representing belief: beyond probability and logic. The Handbook of Rationality, Part II: Theorical rationality (Section 4: Probabilistic Reasoning), https://mitpress.mit.edu/about, 2021, 978-0262045070. ⟨hal-03545993⟩
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